Leaked Agreement on Zangezur Corridor Signals Russia’s Waning Grip on South Caucasus
A tentative agreement reported between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye on the long‑debated Zangezur Corridor marks a watershed moment in the South Caucasus—crystallizing a shift in regional power dynamics as Russia grapples with a faltering economy, its war in Ukraine, and diminishing influence.
Though officials in Yerevan, Baku, and Ankara have yet to confirm details, multiple sources—including Turkiye Today—describe a consensus that a direct rail and road passage will now connect Azerbaijan’s mainland to its exclave Nakhchivan via Armenia’s Syunik region, without Russian control over the route. The corridor promises to link Central Asia and China to Turkey and Europe, bypassing Moscow’s traditional transport monopoly.
This development comes against a backdrop of Russia’s deepening strategic retreat. Once the essential security broker in the region, Moscow has seen its influence siphoned away since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Analysts note that Russian military presence such as peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh has diminished, and its economic leverage, too, is fraying under sanctions and wartime strain.
The corridor’s potential opening is more than a transit deal. For Azerbaijan and Turkey, it represents a symbolic and economic coup: a practical expression of their “Central Corridor” ambition, aimed at wresting influence from Russia and Iran. For Armenia, cautiously embracing the plan might symbolize a move toward economic integration—while testing its sovereignty.
Turkey, rising as a Caucasus power, has already invested heavily in its segment of the route and may oversee construction and management. This cements Ankara’s growing role, undercutting Russia’s once-dominant offer of security and political patronage.
Russia is unlikely to accept the corridor if Moscow remains sidelined. Historically, Moscow secured its role through peacekeeping troops and oversight of regional transit. Yet its capacity is dwindling: its economy is strained by war spending and Western sanctions, with inflation and industrial weakness following suit.
Still, Yerevan risks backlash. The Armenian public remains suspicious, fearing the loss of control over its territory and a surge in Turkish influence. National sovereignty and security concerns—particularly regarding the corridor’s proximity to Iran—remain deeply contested.
Iran, too, views the corridor as a geopolitical rival. Dubbing it a “Turani” or NATO project, Tehran fears diminished transit relevance and increased Turkish encroachment.
For now, the corridor remains a proposal. But its momentum signals a broader recalibration: Armenia and Azerbaijan are prioritizing economic access and Western engagement over Moscow’s traditional primacy. Washington and Brussels are likely watching closely, as the South Caucasus enters a new regional configuration—one where Russian influence is increasingly conditional, not assured.
Should this trilateral understanding be formalized, it will represent a striking reversal: two decades ago, such a strategic route would have required Kremlin blessing. Now, it may proceed despite Moscow’s disapproval—marking a historic turning point in the region’s geopolitical evolution.
