Leaked FSB Document Shows Russia’s Deep Distrust of China

A newly leaked internal document from Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), obtained by The New York Times via the cyber group Ares Leaks, exposes one of the Kremlin’s best-kept secrets: Russia does NOT trust China.

Despite years of choreographed diplomatic unity, the FSB refers to China as an “enemy” behind closed doors and even fears a potential invasion.

Six Western intelligence agencies have confirmed the authenticity of the eight-page report, which reveals the extent of Russia’s anxiety over Beijing’s espionage, territorial ambitions, and growing assertiveness.

The report, completed shortly before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, outlines a counterintelligence initiative called “Antanta-4.” Its main goal is to combat Chinese infiltration.

According to the FSB, Beijing has intensified efforts to recruit Russian insiders, particularly scientists with access to sensitive military data. These operations target cutting-edge technologies—including those used in the war in Ukraine—suggesting China is quietly building its military capabilities by siphoning intelligence from its so-called strategic partner.

But espionage is only part of the threat. The document warns that China is closely monitoring Russia’s battlefield tactics, analyzing Western weapons like the Javelin and HIMARS systems in real-time. The FSB fears that these insights aren’t being shared for mutual benefit, but absorbed to prepare China for future conflicts — potentially even against Russia itself.

Most provocative is the FSB’s concern about China’s intentions in the Russian Far East. This vast and underpopulated region, rich in resources and historically contested, was annexed by the Russian Empire through treaties China has never fully accepted. The Aigun Treaty of 1858 and the Peking Treaty of 1860, both signed under duress, remain a grievance for Chinese nationalists. The leaked document highlights Beijing’s efforts to reassert interest in the area—through maps, rhetoric, and a presence cloaked in academia or business. Espionage activity has even been flagged in the Arctic, where Chinese mining and research outfits allegedly operate as intelligence fronts.

Publicly, the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai continue their high-profile bromance. Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have met dozens of times and praised the “no-limits” partnership between their nations. Military drills, energy deals, and soaring trade figures appear to cement a powerful alliance. Yet the FSB’s private assessments suggest paranoia and distrust beneath the surface—particularly following a 2023 Chinese map that restored historical Chinese names to territories now held by Russia.

Some analysts interpret China’s strategy as a slow, calculated campaign to wear down its rivals. Beijing supports Moscow just enough to keep it bogged down in Ukraine and diplomatically isolated. As Russia weakens under the pressure of war and sanctions, China expands its economic, technological, and territorial influence — positioning itself to benefit from Russia’s decline.

As of June 7, 2025, neither Moscow nor Beijing has issued an official comment on the leak. But the damage is done.

The FSB’s internal fears make clear that trust within the Russia-China axis is thinner than advertised.

What emerges from this leak is not only a warning about China’s ambitions, but a stark illustration of Russia’s growing vulnerability—and the fragility of alliances built on desperation rather than genuine partnership.