Trump’s Retreat in Alaska: How Putin Played the American President

In his column “Trump’s U-Turn” for Vot Tak, Vitaly Portnikov offers a searing analysis of Donald Trump’s meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska. His argument is clear: the encounter demonstrated not strength or diplomacy, but a collapse of Western unity and another successful manipulation by the Kremlin. Reading Portnikov, one is struck not only by the sharpness of his critique, but by the accuracy with which he dissects Trump’s political weaknesses.

As Portnikov reminds us, skepticism surrounded the summit long before Air Force One touched down at Andrews Air Force Base. He writes:

“Already on the eve of the meeting between the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation in Alaska, many observers expressed serious doubts about its effectiveness.

If Donald Trump really had leverage over the Russian leader that could lead to at least a ceasefire in the Russian-Ukrainian war, he would have used it during numerous telephone conversations. But Vladimir Putin stubbornly rejected any demands of the American president.”

That opening sets the tone for the entire piece. Trump, in Portnikov’s telling, entered negotiations already defeated. Putin had long since learned how to exploit “Trump’s human weaknesses and political shortsightedness to stall for time — to continue the war without the threat of serious external pressure.” Compliments and flattery, mixed with false promises of future talks, were enough to make the American president step back from sanction threats.

The pattern repeated itself in Alaska. Earlier in the year, European leaders had pressed Trump to back sanctions if Moscow refused a ceasefire by May 12. Putin’s response was pure theater: the suggestion of Istanbul negotiations, nothing more than a façade of “peaceful intentions.” Yet that was enough to convince Trump to fold.

Portnikov emphasizes the devastating consequences of this weakness:

“Now we see the same picture. After yet another phone call between Putin and Trump, followed by a massive shelling of Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, the Kremlin is faced with a 50-day ultimatum from the American president.

New sanctions could hit not only Russia, but also its energy sponsors, China and India. Putin needed to get Trump to back down from such pressure, if only to preserve the market for his oil. If not for India, with which Trump had already entered into an economic confrontation using the war as a pretext, then at least for China.

And the Russian president has found a successful antidote to this pressure — a personal meeting, which, according to rumors, Trump has long dreamed of.

As a result, no new sanctions are going to be introduced, promises are being made again ‘in two or three weeks’ — it seems that it is not Putin who is stalling for time, but Trump himself who is refusing to seriously influence Russia.”

This is the heart of the critique. Trump is not merely failing to pressure Russia; he is actively becoming a partner in Putin’s strategy of delay. Each empty promise of “two or three weeks” buys Moscow more time to bomb Ukrainian cities while avoiding economic punishment.

The outcome of the Alaska meeting, Portnikov concludes, was predictable: “Putin winning and Trump losing.” He underscores the symbolism — a red carpet at the airport, a U.S. president greeting Putin personally at the steps of his plane. These images confirm the Russian leader’s belief that international isolation is over, that America itself has joined him in legitimizing aggression.

Even more alarming is Trump’s rhetorical shift. The American president who once demanded an “unconditional ceasefire” now echoes Putin’s line that a ceasefire is impossible and that it is “better to talk about a peace treaty.” As Portnikov asks, how long would such a treaty take to negotiate? How many bombs and missiles will devastate Ukraine in the meantime? How much land will Russia seize under the cover of endless “diplomacy”?

This is not just a tactical error, Portnikov insists. It is a strategic catastrophe. Trump, “judging by the results of the meeting, no longer feels like a part of this West.” If the United States drifts away from its allies, the balance of global power shifts in ways that cannot be easily reversed. Russia can turn toward China. But America, isolated from Europe and the democratic world, has nowhere to go.

Portnikov’s article should be read not as a partisan broadside but as a warning. When he writes that Trump “shrugs his shoulders and claims that he has ‘provided space for diplomacy,’” the point is not that diplomacy is illegitimate, but that it is being cynically weaponized.

Putin does not negotiate to end wars; he negotiates to prolong them, to stall sanctions, to weaken Western resolve. Trump, whether out of vanity, shortsightedness, or misplaced sympathy, is allowing himself to be an accomplice.

The “U-turn” in Alaska, then, is not just about one meeting. It is about the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy under Trump’s second presidency: away from Europe, away from democracy, and dangerously close to Moscow.

In fully endorsing Portnikov’s analysis, one must also underline his conclusion: Putin’s strategy is succeeding, and America’s credibility is collapsing. Unless this trend is reversed, the victims will not only be Ukraine but the very structure of the Western alliance itself.

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