Why Iran Won’t Close the Strait of Hormuz And How It Mirrors Russia’s Own Nuclear Bluff

With tensions in the Middle East rising, Iran’s familiar threat to close the Strait of Hormuz has resurfaced. Yet for all its frequency, the threat has never been carried out—and for good reason. Blocking the Strait would not only trigger Western retaliation, but it would collapse Iran’s economy almost overnight. Like Russia’s nuclear posturing, Iran’s warnings are not meant to be acted upon. They’re designed to paralyze, intimidate, and extract concessions—without crossing the line that leads to self-destruction.

Roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making it one of the most strategically sensitive waterways on Earth. For Iran, it is both a lifeline and a lever. Closing it would indeed spike global oil prices, potentially trigger recessionary pressures, and draw in regional powers like the UAE or Oman. But it would also stop Iran’s own exports and sever vital trade routes. Iran’s economy—already under heavy sanctions—would not survive the move.

That’s what makes it so effective as a threat. It’s powerful precisely because it’s not used. The moment Iran closes the Strait, it transforms from a regional power with leverage to a regime under immediate, multilateral attack. A similar principle applies to Russia’s nuclear threats. The weapons serve their purpose by existing and being referenced—not by being deployed. If either state follows through, they lose the very strategic ambiguity that keeps their adversaries cautious.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy notes that Iran’s Hormuz rhetoric has long echoed Russia’s nuclear language. It’s about freezing action, not initiating it. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have already lifted oil prices by over 10%, showing that limited disruption alone can send a global message. The Iranian regime understands this and has mastered the art of pushing the edge without toppling into open war.

If Iran were to miscalculate, the precedent is clear. In 1988, after Iran mined the Gulf, the United States launched Operation Praying Mantis, sinking several Iranian vessels and destroying military infrastructure. A similar response today would likely involve coordinated U.S., U.K., and French airstrikes against IRGC positions, followed by naval enforcement of freedom of navigation. It would not be limited to rhetoric or sanctions.

But Tehran is not interested in that outcome. Nor is Moscow. Both regimes rely on these high-stakes threats to maintain internal control, influence foreign policy, and deter action without inviting annihilation. In both cases, the bluff is the weapon. Once used, it loses all value.

That is why neither Iran nor Russia will take the ultimate step. Closing the Strait or launching nuclear weapons would be acts of regime suicide—not strategic brilliance. Their power lies in keeping the world afraid of what might happen, not in unleashing it. The threat only works so long as it remains just that: a threat.