China Arms Russia’s Drone Surge as Washington Looks the Other Way

Ukraine’s dominance in drone warfare is eroding—and fast. Once a symbol of Ukrainian innovation and battlefield adaptability, the drone war is shifting in Russia’s favor. The reason is clear, if largely unspoken: Chinese parts, Chinese support, and a growing silence from Washington.
In 2024, Ukraine produced nearly one million tactical drones. It aimed for 2.5 million in 2025—an ambitious plan to offset artillery shortages and manpower constraints. But a Politico report confirms what Ukrainian officials have long warned: Russia is rapidly closing the gap, thanks to covert Chinese assistance that’s enabling Moscow to outproduce Kyiv.
Beijing’s Covert Contribution
According to Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, Chinese companies are supplying Russia with essential drone components—optics, engines, navigation systems, chips—through front companies designed to bypass Western sanctions. While Beijing formally denies involvement, intelligence officials say these denials are cosmetic.
“Officially, China is neutral,” says Oleg Aleksandrov of Ukraine’s foreign intelligence. “But unofficially, their parts are all over Russian drones.”
Ukrainian customs data shows that 98% of drones imported in early 2025 were Chinese. Nearly all ended up in Russian hands. Meanwhile, Chinese-made drones like the DJI Mavic—widely used on the battlefield—are no longer sold to Ukraine or the EU. President Zelenskyy has accused Beijing of applying “selective neutrality” that benefits Moscow and weakens Ukraine.
Russia’s Drone Ambitions
With China’s help, Russia now aims to produce:
- 2 million FPV (first-person view) tactical drones
- 30,000 long-range drones
- 30,000 decoys
These figures dwarf Ukraine’s projected output, threatening to overwhelm its air defenses.
Worse, the supply chain is evolving. U.S. and European officials report that Chinese firms like Xiamen Limbach Aircraft Engine Co. and Redlepus Vector Industry are no longer just supplying parts—they’re shipping entire combat drones. The Garpiya series, already used in strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, represents a new level of technological support.
Sanctions Without Teeth
The U.S. has sanctioned several Chinese firms linked to Russian drone production. But the response has been piecemeal. Much of the technology arriving in Russia still includes American-designed components, underscoring how easily sanctions are being skirted.
The EU is considering similar measures, but momentum is slow. Meanwhile, Kyiv has lodged formal complaints with Beijing, which have been ignored. Chinese officials insist their trade is legal and WTO-compliant. Their September 2023 export restrictions on civilian drones, intended to look like a gesture of neutrality, in practice hurt Ukraine more than Russia.
America’s Strategic Drift
Compounding the problem is a political shift in Washington. Once the engine behind Ukraine’s defense, the U.S. is no longer showing the same urgency.
Military aid was stalled in Congress for months. Donald Trump, now the presumptive Republican nominee, recently held a 75-minute call with Vladimir Putin. He described it as “a good conversation.” He did not mention Ukraine.
For the Kremlin, this signals opportunity. For Beijing, it offers cover. For Kyiv, it’s a warning that the West’s resolve is fraying—even as Russia’s arsenal grows stronger.
China’s War by Other Means
The “no-limits” partnership announced by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in 2022 is no longer just symbolic. It now runs through factories, shipping manifests, and battlefield wreckage.
China is helping Russia prolong this war—not with troops, but with engines and circuits. Its support is cost-effective, deniable, and devastating. It makes sanctions harder to enforce, and diplomacy easier to dodge.
The Risk Ahead
Drones were a cornerstone of Ukraine’s asymmetric warfare. If that edge is lost, so too is a key pillar of its resilience—both militarily and politically.
What’s emerging is not just a drone imbalance, but a geopolitical one. Russia has a partner willing to fuel its war quietly and relentlessly. Ukraine, by contrast, has allies increasingly divided, distracted, or disengaged.
Unless Washington and Brussels act decisively to cut China’s pipeline—and to renew their strategic focus—Kyiv’s technological advantage may not survive 2025. And neither, perhaps, will the leverage it needs to end this war on its own terms.