Russia Ramps Up Support for Houthis as Middle East Oil Routes Close
Russia’s relationship with Yemen’s Houthis has moved steadily beyond diplomacy. Over the past two years, evidence has emerged of Russian intelligence assistance, military advisers and negotiations over advanced weapons for the Iranian-backed movement. Now that relationship carries much greater consequences.
On September 11, Houthi forces seized Perim, or Mayun Island, in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, along with nearby territory on Yemen’s Red Sea coast. The advance gives the Houthis a dramatically stronger position around one of the world’s critical maritime chokepoints.
It comes as the Middle East’s oil-export infrastructure is already under extraordinary pressure. Iran has disrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, while Saudi Arabia has now shut its East-West pipeline following a drone attack. That pipeline normally provides a route around Hormuz for millions of barrels per day. Saudi crude exports have consequently fallen to levels not seen in decades.
Against this background, Moscow’s developing relationship with the Houthis deserves renewed attention.
The strongest publicly reported evidence emerged in 2024. The Wall Street Journal reported, citing people familiar with U.S. intelligence, that Russia supplied satellite targeting information to the Houthis, with the information transmitted through Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The intelligence assisted Houthi attacks against shipping in the Red Sea.
There was also a physical Russian presence. U.S. officials reported that Russian military personnel traveled to Houthi-controlled Yemen in 2024, where they were expected to advise the group. Carnegie later reported that Russian GRU military intelligence advisers were operating in Sanaa.
Then came weapons discussions.
Russia entered negotiations over providing the Houthis with Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles, the export version of Russia’s P-800 Oniks. Talks reportedly took place through Iran. Such weapons would significantly increase the danger not merely to merchant vessels but potentially to Western naval forces operating around Yemen.
Moscow’s motive is not difficult to identify. In June 2024, after Western governments relaxed some restrictions on Ukraine using Western weapons against targets inside Russia, Vladimir Putin publicly threatened an asymmetric response: Russia could provide weapons to actors capable of attacking Western interests elsewhere. U.S. officials subsequently viewed Moscow’s contemplated support for the Houthis through precisely that lens.
Iran nevertheless remains the Houthis’ principal foreign military patron. Tehran has supplied the movement with sophisticated missile, drone and other weapons technology for years, and Iranian involvement has intensified again in 2026. Reuters reported in July that IRGC commanders, advisers and missile and drone equipment had been transported into Houthi-controlled Yemen.
What has changed is Russia’s willingness to supplement that support.
For Moscow, the Houthis offer something valuable: a relatively inexpensive means of forcing Western governments to devote military resources to another theater while creating instability along trade and energy routes vital to Europe and the United States.
With Hormuz severely disrupted and the Houthis now positioned astride Bab el-Mandeb, that strategy is no longer an obscure subplot of Russia’s confrontation with the West. Two of the world’s most important maritime gateways are under unprecedented pressure, and Moscow has spent years building ties with one of the forces applying it.
