Putin’s grip on Eastern Europes as demonstrations rock Budapest and Belgrade
In a striking display of public dissent, massive protests rocked Budapest and Belgrade on June 28, 2025, signaling mounting instability for two of Russia’s key European allies, Hungary and Serbia. Prime Ministers Viktor Orbán and President Aleksandar Vučić, often seen as Moscow’s staunchest supporters in Europe, are grappling with humiliating demonstrations and, in Hungary’s case, collapsing poll numbers, raising questions about their political survival and Russia’s influence in the region.
In Budapest, over 100,000 people defied a government ban to join the 30th annual Pride parade, repurposed as a broader anti-Orbán rally. The Fidesz party’s March 2025 legislation, which banned LGBTQ+ marches under “child protection” pretexts, aimed to suppress the event with threats of fines and imprisonment. Yet, Budapest’s liberal mayor, Gergely Karácsony, outmaneuvered the government by designating the march a municipal “Day of Freedom,” bypassing police permits. The massive turnout, backed by international figures like European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, showcased defiance against Orbán’s authoritarian grip and his alignment with Moscow’s “traditional values” rhetoric.
Recent polls underscore this erosion of support: a Median survey from June 18, 2025, showed the opposition Tisza party, led by Péter Magyar, surging to 51% among decided voters, while Fidesz trailed at 34%, a 15-point gap that signals a dramatic shift ahead of the 2026 election.
In Belgrade, an estimated 140,000 protesters flooded the streets, demanding Vučić’s resignation and snap elections. Sparked by the November 2024 collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad, which killed 15 due to alleged corruption and shoddy construction tied to Chinese contractors, the protests have grown into a nationwide movement against Vučić’s 13-year rule. Students, farmers, and opposition leaders united in a show of strength, undeterred by government tactics like canceling public transport and Vučić’s claims of a Western-backed “color revolution.” Despite his attempts to deflect blame, the protests’ scale—potentially Serbia’s largest ever—marks a significant challenge to his authority.
Both leaders’ alignment with Russia has amplified their vulnerabilities. Orbán, a vocal critic of EU sanctions on Moscow and an opponent of Ukrainian aid, faces accusations of selling Hungary out to Russian and Chinese interests, with public frustration over economic stagnation and corruption fueling Tisza’s rise. Vučić, while balancing EU candidacy with Russian ties, has leaned on Moscow’s propaganda to paint protesters as foreign agents, a narrative echoed by Putin but failing to quell public anger.
These events signal a broader unraveling for Putin’s European allies. Hungary’s shifting polls and Serbia’s mass protests reflect growing public rejection of autocratic governance and pro-Russian policies. As Orbán and Vučić face humiliating setbacks, Russia’s influence in Europe appears increasingly fragile, with democratic movements challenging the Kremlin’s puppets and reshaping the region’s political landscape.
